Tracing the reversal of fortune in the Americas. Bolivian GDP per capita since the mid-nineteenth century by Herranz Loncán, Alfonso & Peres Cajías, José Alejandro
1 
 
Tracing the reversal of fortune in the Americas.  Bolivian GDP per capita since the 
mid-nineteenth century 
 
 
Alfonso Herranz-Loncán 
Department of Economic History and Institutions 
University of Barcelona 
Diagonal, 690 
08034 Barcelona (Spain) 
 
José A. Peres-Cajías 
Escuela de la Producción y la Competitividad 
Universidad Católica Boliviana “San Pablo” 
Av. 14 de Septiembre, 4807 
La Paz (Bolivia) 
 
Abstract  
 
In the centuries before the Spanish conquest, the Bolivian space was among the most 
highly urbanised and complex societies in the Americas. In contrast, in the early 21st 
century Bolivia is one of the poorest economies on the continent. According to 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002), this disparity between precolonial opulence 
and current poverty would make Bolivia a perfect example of “reversal of fortune” 
(RF). This hypothesis, however, has been criticised for oversimplifying long-term 
development processes by “compressing” history (Austin, 2008). In the case of Bolivia, 
a comprehensive description and explanation of the RF process would require a global 
approach to the entire postcolonial period, which has been prevented so far by the lack 
of quantitative information for the period before 1950. This paper aims to fill that gap 
by providing new income per capita estimates for Bolivia in 1890-1950 and a point 
guesstimate for the mid-nineteenth century. Our figures indicate that divergence has not 
been a persistent feature of Bolivian economic history. Instead, it was concentrated in 
the 19th century and the second half of the 20th century, and it was actually during the 
latter that the country joined the ranks of the poorest economies in Latin America. By 
contrast, during the first half of the 20th century, the country converged with both the 
industrialised and the richest Latin American economies. The Bolivian postcolonial era 
cannot therefore be described as one of sustained divergence. Instead, the Bolivian RF 
was largely the combined result of post-independence stagnation and the catastrophic 
crises of the late 20th century. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the centuries before the Spanish conquest, the Bolivian space was among the most 
highly urbanised and, arguably, most complex and developed societies in the Americas. 
According to the estimates reported in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002), the 
urbanisation rate in the Bolivian area ca. 1500 was, together with those in Mexico, 
Ecuador and Peru, the highest on the continent. The economic prominence of the 
Bolivian space was consolidated after the Spanish conquest due to silver discoveries, 
and the Bolivian city of Potosi became one of the most important economic centres in 
the Americas during the colonial era. For a long period of time, Potosi silver production 
was critical to the world economy (Pomeranz, 2000: 269-274), for regional economic 
integration (Assadourian, 1982) and to sustaining the Spanish administration (TePaske 
and Klein, 1982). Despite its gradual loss of position in favour of other areas of the 
Empire, Potosi remained an important economic centre until the collapse of the Spanish 
colonial power (Tandeter 1993; Grafe and Irigoin, 2006).1
In stark contrast with its prosperity during precolonial and colonial times, in the early 
21st century Bolivia is one of the poorest economies in the Americas. In 2013, according 
to the World Bank, its income per capita (PPP-adjusted) was the fourth lowest on the 
continent, just ahead of Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua, and the country ranked 113th in 
the Human Development Index (UNDP). The HDI figure becomes substantially worse 
if it is corrected for inequality: Bolivia is a very unequal economy in one of the most 
unequal regions of the world (SEDLAC). 
 Not surprisingly, today, 
almost 500 years after their arrival in the region (1548), Spaniards still use the 
expression “vale un Potosí” (it is worth a “Potosi”) as equivalent to “it is worth a 
fortune”. 
This contrast between precolonial and colonial opulence and current relative poverty 
would make Bolivia a perfect example of the so-called “reversal of fortune” (Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson, 2002). According to this hypothesis, among the countries 
colonised by European powers since 1500, those that were relatively rich at the 
beginning of the colonial era are now relatively poor and vice versa. The reversal of 
                                                          
1 The economic importance of Potosi was higher at the beginning of the colonial period (1570-1630) than 
thereafter (Bakewell, 1984; Tandeter, 1993). Recent works by Arroyo-Abad et al. (2012) and Allen et al 
(2011) show the relative decline of Potosi relative to other economies in the Americas and the world since 
the second half of the 17th Century. 
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fortune would be the result of an institutional reversal created by the colonisers, who 
were more prone to establish extractive institutions in rich areas, and institutions that 
encouraged investment in poor regions. After independence, the continuity in the rent-
seeking and investment-discouraging character of the institutional framework in 
previously rich areas would have prevented them from taking advantage of 
opportunities to grow and industrialise, and would have condemned them to divergence. 
Although extractive institutions could generate some growth, this would be intrinsically 
limited and would last only so long before being destroyed by political instability 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002: 1266) explicitly mention Potosi among the 
examples of territories where Europeans established an institutional framework that 
would have hindered growth and investment in the long term. According to them, “(...) 
the area now corresponding to Bolivia was seven times more densely settled than the 
area corresponding to Argentina; so on the basis of [our] regression, we expect 
Argentina to be three times as rich as Bolivia, which is more or less the current gap in 
income between these countries” (ibid., p. 1248). Similarly, in their most recent book, 
Why Nations Fail, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) state that Bolivia, due to its 
institutional setting, has always belonged to the poorest group of the Latin American 
economies, and consider the 1952 Bolivian Revolution as a typical example of political 
instability generated by long-term established extractive institutions.2
The “reversal of fortune” hypothesis, however, has been criticised for oversimplifying 
historical processes and “compressing” history. For instance, in the case of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Austin (2008) stresses the difficulty of providing general explanations for a 
region with wide variations in economic growth experiences over time and across 
countries. Similarly, Frankema and Van Waijenburg (2012), in their reconstruction of 
the evolution of real wages in several British African colonies between 1880 and 1965, 
 In the same vein, 
Dell (2010) identifies a number of channels through which the negative effects of the 
mining mita, a forced labour system instituted by the Spaniards in Peru and Bolivia in 
1573, have persisted over time and have affected the current development levels of the 
areas where it was established. 
                                                          
2 In Why Nations Fail, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012: 104) also provide a different, less optimistic, view 
of the Argentinean development process than in their previous works. In this new book they consider the 
country’s economic dynamism before the 1920s as a typical example of unsustainable growth under 
extractive institutions. 
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have found some historical periods of both high economic dynamism and substantial 
intraregional variation. This indeed warns against the limitations of a historical analysis 
based on linking two distant “moments in time without reviewing possible changes 
during the centuries in between” (ibid.; p. 898). 
In the case of Bolivia, the absence of information on economic growth before 1950 has 
so far prevented detailed analysis of variations in the country's long-term economic 
performance over time. It is true that the available official series of income per capita, 
which starts in 1950, clearly indicates that the second half of the 20th century was a 
period that saw Bolivia diverge from the world’s core economies. More precisely, 
according to the New Maddison Project database, Bolivian pc GDP represented 20 
percent of US pc GDP in 1950 and only 10 percent in 2010. However, it is interesting to 
observe that the Bolivian divergence was not sustained over time, but was associated 
with two specific economic catastrophes: i) the depression that followed the 1952 
Revolution, and ii) the debt crisis and the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s.  
Therefore, far from being a sustained process, Bolivian divergence during the second 
half of the 20th century seems to have been associated with certain conjunctures. The 
available research on the period before 1950 also seems to suggest an alternation of 
cycles of stagnation and economic dynamism. For instance, instability, de-urbanization, 
export stagnation and (since 1870) the decrease in silver prices and the Bolivian terms 
of trade would have reduced the country’s potential for economic growth and 
convergence during the second half of the 19th century (Huber, 1991; Pacheco, 2011; 
Langer, 2004; Mitre, 1981; Klein 2011; Bértola, 2011). In contrast, the boom in rubber 
and, especially, tin exports since the early 20th century would have boosted a sustained 
growth process at least until the Great Depression of 1929 (Mitre, 1993; Bértola, 2011), 
a crisis which would have had a relatively mild impact in Bolivia, compared with other 
Latin American countries (Bértola, 2011: 262). 
Unfortunately, so far the lack of information on crucial magnitudes of the Bolivian 
economy has prevented historians from testing any hypotheses on the country’s relative 
performance since independence. Indeed, analyses of Bolivian long-term economic 
growth have suffered so far, either from being constrained to the second half of the 20th 
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century,3 or from lacking a homogeneous indicator of economic performance for the 
whole postcolonial period.4
This paper aims to fill this gap by providing estimates of the Bolivian income per capita 
from the mid nineteenth century to 1950. More specifically, we present new yearly 
income per capita figures for 1890-1950 and a point guesstimate for the mid-nineteenth 
century. The new series may help to discover when Bolivia left its ancient colonial 
centrality and became a marginal space in the Americas, and to identify the main 
periods of Bolivian economic divergence after independence. The results of our 
estimation indicate that divergence, which originated before the mid-19th century, has 
not been a persistent feature of postcolonial Bolivian economic history. Instead, it 
seems to have been concentrated in the second half of the 19th century and the 
catastrophic episodes of the second half of the 20th century. It was only in this second 
period that the country joined the ranks of the poorest economies in Latin America. In 
contrast, during the first half of the 20th century, economic growth was not low by 
international standards, and Bolivia converged both with the core countries and with the 
richest economies in the region. It is therefore difficult to describe the postcolonial era 
in Bolivia as one of sustained divergence, but a much more complex process in which 
the country was unable to take advantage of available growth opportunities in certain 
crucial periods. 
 
 This is the first attempt to estimate the long term evolution of Bolivian pc GDP before 
1950. There are, however, some antecedents for some specific periods or benchmark 
years. More precisely, Mendieta and Martín (2009) have estimated yearly GDP figures 
for 1929-1950 through a regression with three independent variables: exports, public 
expenditure and money supply (real M3). Morales and Pacheco (1999) report average 
GDP growth rates for some subperiods between 1900 and 1945, and yearly GDP figures 
for 1928-1936, although without giving information on their estimation methodology. 
Finally, Hofman (2001) provides GDP estimates for 1900, 1913 and 1929, also without 
indicating sources or estimation methods. The next section presents the sources and 
methods that we used to carry out our own estimation of the evolution of Bolivian GDP 
                                                          
3 See, for instance, Mercado et al. (2005); Humérez et al. (2006); Grebe et al. (2012); Machicado et al. 
(2012); and Pereira et al. (2012). 
4 Some quantitative approaches to the evolution of some sectors or certain specific periods can be found, 
for instance, in Morales and Pacheco (1999); Mendieta and Martin (2009); Bértola (2011); Peres Cajias 
(2014); or Carreras-Marín, Badia-Miró and Peres-Cajías (2013). 
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between the mid nineteenth century and 1950, and compares it with these alternative 
estimates. Section 3 provides the sources and methods used to “guesstimate” the level 
of Bolivian GDP pc by 1846. On the basis of the new estimates, Section 4 analyzes 
Bolivian economic growth in detail and its long-term divergence from the core 
countries and the main economies of the region. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Bolivian pc GDP between 1890 and 1950: sources and estimation methods 
Our GDP series is based on the production approach. In order to provide a consistent 
link between our series and the current GDP figures, the starting point of the estimation 
is the value added of each Bolivian economic sector in 1950, taken from the official 
national accounts (Table 1). We have then estimated a series of real gross output for 
1890-1950 for each of the sectors considered in that classification, which we have used 
to extend backwards each 1950 sectoral value added figure, under the assumption that, 
in each sector, gross output and value added evolved at the same pace. Finally, we have 
taken the sum of the resulting sectoral value added series as the yearly estimation of the 
Bolivian GDP. 
 
Table 1. Sectoral composition of the Bolivian GDP (1950) 
Agrarian Sector 31.21 
Mining and petroleum industry 15.48 
Mining 14.94 
Petroleum industry 0.54 
Manufacturing industry 14.08 
Urban industry 13.12 
Rural artisan production 0.96 
Utilities 1.39 
Construction 2.36 
Services 35.48 
Government 5.36 
Transport 6.67 
Trade 11.32 
Housing rents 4.93 
Financial and other 
services 
7.20 
TOTAL 100 
Source: Sector percentages (in 1958 prices, the earliest available) have been taken from the ECLAC 
webpage, and the importance of the subsectors within each main sector comes from CEPAL (1958).  
Notes: We have introduced two modifications into the original ECLAC data. First, we have corrected the 
sectoral percentages to account for the fact that financial services were not included in the ECLAC 
database before 1962 (the series included instead a non-classified “statistical difference” up to that year, 
which we have taken as a basis for our estimation of the weight of the financial sector). Second, we have 
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corrected the percentage of construction to account for the fact that the 1950 figure was a clear outlier; we 
have instead taken the average percentage for 1950-1955 and have recalculated the relative importance of 
the remaining sectors accordingly. 
 
The quality of our results is affected by the absence of information for some sectors, 
which is especially serious in the case of agriculture, the manufacturing industry before 
1925, and domestic trade services, and may have introduced biases of unknown 
direction in the level, fluctuations and composition of the series. In addition, our 
estimation also suffers from the lack of information on the evolution of prices and 
productivity in each sector, which has forced us to introduce a number of simplifying 
assumptions in the estimation. However, the importance of this problem is reduced by 
the low technological dynamism of an exceedingly large share of the Bolivian economy 
during the period under study; on the other hand, throughout the text we provide the 
results of some sensitivity tests that suggest that the main conclusions of our research 
are not affected by the assumptions that underlie the estimation. Nevertheless, due to the 
gradual reduction in the amount and quality of the available empirical information as 
the series go back into the past, it is necessary to allow for relatively large error margins 
in the case of the earliest observations.  
 
Population 
The available information on the historical evolution of the Bolivian population is very 
scarce. For the 19th century there is no official census, however, there are published 
estimates for different benchmark years (1825, 1831, 1835, 1846, 1854, 1865 and 
1882). These seem to have been obtained with different methodologies and are mutually 
inconsistent, involving huge and unlikely demographic changes in different directions 
over short periods of time (Barragán, 2002; Urquiola, 1999: 216). In the case of the first 
half of the 20th century, apart from a few incomplete estimates for some intermediate 
years which do not cover the entire national territory, there are only two national 
censuses available, which were carried out in 1900 and 1950. The estimates for the 19th 
century, together with the national census totals, are reproduced in Table 2.5
 
 
                                                          
5 We have excluded from the 1900 figure the population from the former Bolivian coastal areas (Litoral), 
which were still included in the census despite having being lost in the Pacific War. 
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Table 2. Available estimates of Bolivian population (1825-1950) 
Year Population 
1825 1,100,000 
1831 1,088,768 
1835 1,060,777 
1846 1,373,896 
1854 2,326,126 
1865 1,813,233 
1882 1,172,156 
1900 1,766,451 
1950 2,704,165 
Source: Barragán (2002) and National Censuses of 1900 and 1950. 
 
Our estimation of the Bolivian population since the late nineteenth century is based on a 
geometric interpolation between the three national estimates that we consider the most 
reliable among those available: the 1900 and 1950 national censuses and the 1846 
figure. The latter comes from Dalence (1851), and is usually preferred in Bolivian 
historiography, because it was elaborated in the context of an exhaustive and detailed 
survey of the Bolivian economy. The main shortcoming of the 1846 estimation is 
uncertainty on the size of the so-called “infidel” tribal population, which seems to 
account for those indigenous communities that were not yet fully integrated in the 
Bolivian state institutional structure. These communities, which the 1900 and 1950 
National Census estimated at 91,000 and 87,000 individuals respectively,6
                                                          
6 The 1900 national census distributed this population as follows: 27% in the Department of Tarija, 21% 
in the Department of Santa Cruz, 16% in the “Territorio de Colonias”, 16% in the Department of La Paz 
and less than 10% each in the Departments of Beni, Cochabamba and Chuquisaca. The distribution of this 
population in 1950 was similar, and is consistent with the history of Bolivian State expansion (Barragán 
and Peres-Cajías, 2007), since the “infidel population” would be located mainly in the tropical lowlands 
and the Chaco, i.e. mostly in the northern and eastern areas of the country. 
 were 
considered by Dalence in the mid 19th century to amount to approximately 760,000 
people, i.e. 35.6 percent of the total Bolivian population. However, this figure (which is 
not included in the 1846 total population reported in Table 2) must be taken with certain 
caution, since it would involve a substantial net demographic decrease in the Bolivian 
population of more than 200,000 inhabitants throughout the second half of the 19th 
century, a period of demographic expansion in all Latin American countries (Yáñez et 
al., 2012). The 1950 national census also considers this figure unrealistic and suggests 
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that the “infidel” population would have amounted instead to 100,000 individuals by the 
mid 19th century.7
Given that uncertainty, we have estimated two population series. One includes all 
individuals properly accounted for by the Bolivian State, and the other also includes the 
population of the “infidel” or “non-subjected” (as the 1900 Census calls them) 
communities. The former is the result of making a geometric interpolation between 
Dalence’s figure for 1846 (“infidels” excluded) and the National Censuses of 1900 and 
1950.
 
8 In the latter we add an almost stagnant series of “non-subjected” population that 
decreased monotonously from 100,000 individuals ca. 1854 to 91,000 in 1900 and 
87,000 in 1950. In turn, we divide the first series between urban and rural population. 
We consider as urban the population living in cities with more than 2,000 inhabitants in 
each of the three benchmark years, and all the remaining population as rural. With this 
broad definition of cities, the Bolivian urbanisation rate is estimated to have increased 
from 11 percent in 1890 to 26 percent in 1950.9
                                                          
7 Neither migration nor the territorial loss associated with the Pacific War might explain a decrease of 
200,000 people in the Bolivian population over the second half of the 19th century. The population of the 
areas that were lost to Chile in the early 1880s may be estimated at ca. 74,000; see Yáñez et al. (2012: 
21). Likewise, net Bolivian migration might have involved even lower numbers. For instance, according 
to each country’s official census, by 1895 the number of Bolivian-born citizens living in Chile and 
Argentina, which were probably the main destinations of Bolivian emigration, was 8,869 and 7,361 
respectively, whereas the number of foreigners living in Bolivia in 1900 was 7,425. Therefore, the 
decrease in the Bolivian population between 1846 and 1900 that Dalence’s estimate would involve might 
only be explained by a catastrophic decline of the “infidel” tribal population (by illness or displacement to 
neighbouring countries). While this possibility cannot be completely ruled out, given the absence of 
information here we have conservatively preferred to accept the 1950 Census suggestion and assume a 
stagnant evolution of this demographic group. Taking Dalence’s figure, however, would not substantially 
alter the main feature of our GDP and per capita GDP series. The main change would obviously affect the 
1846 estimates, which would be 18 and 19 percent lower, respectively, than in our series. This, however, 
would still be consistent with the sustained process of economic divergence of the Bolivian economy 
during the second half of the 19th century that is described below. Later on, the difference would become 
much lower, amounting to just 3 percent in 1890. 
 
8 In order to estimate this series, we have increased the 1950 Census figure by 0.7 percent, which is the 
estimated census omission for that year according to ECLAC; see Yañez et al. (2012: 11). For 1900, the 
Census estimates an omission of 5 percent, which is also incorporated in the calculation. Following Yañez 
et al. (2012), we also account in the series for the demographic effects of the Pacific War (1879) and the 
Chaco War (1932-1935). 
9 Maddison (2003) and Yáñez et al. (2012) provide alternative population series for Bolivia, which start, 
in the first case, in 1900, and, in the second, in 1826. Differences between those series and our own are 
not very large (always lower than 11 percent), with the exception of the last few years of the 19th century 
and the early 20th century in the case of Yáñez et al. (2012). The reason for that difference is twofold. 
First, Yáñez et al. (2012) assume a population figure for 1900 of 1,561,000, much lower than the total 
census estimate. This is apparently the result of the exclusion by those authors of the non-censed 
population, non-subjected communities and census omissions. Second, for 1882 they accept the figure 
reported in Table 2, which we consider a clear underestimate on the basis of the preceding and later 
figures. The result is that our estimate of the Bolivian population for 1890 is 20 percent larger than the 
figures provided by these authors. 
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Agrarian sector  
The available information on the Bolivian agrarian sector before the mid 20th century is 
extremely scarce. The first Agrarian Census was carried out in 1950 (see CEPAL, 
1958). Before that year, there are no reliable agricultural production data for the whole 
country in the official national statistics, and the 1900 national census, for instance, 
considered it impossible to provide even rough estimates of national agrarian 
production, due to the absence of statistical information (1900 National Census, p. 
LXVII). There is also an almost total absence of national production data in the 
historical literature (e.g. Larsson, 1988) and in international statistical publications,10 
with the only exception being a series of rubber exports (which would be barely 
equivalent to output, since practically the whole domestic production was exported) for 
1890 onwards (Gamarra Téllez, 2007).11
Leaving rubber production aside, for the rest of the agrarian sector we have chosen an 
indirect estimation strategy. First, we estimated agrarian output in the mid 19th century 
on the basis of the information reported in Dalence (1851) and the assumption that the 
Bolivian import capacity at the time was relatively low and, therefore, domestic output 
should be enough to feed the Bolivian population.
 
12
 
 Second, we linked the estimate for 
the mid 19th century with 1950 on the basis of the evolution of rural population. 
                                                          
10 The League of Nations and UN yearbooks provide some data on agrarian production for Bolivia, but 
they are difficult to accept, showing huge changes between consecutive years and being inconsistent with 
the information reported in the Agrarian National Census of 1950. 
11 Bolivian foreign trade statistics might underestimate rubber production, since a lot of Bolivian rubber 
was moved to Brazil through the porous border line between both countries. Unfortunately, the 
importance of this smuggling activity is impossible to quantify. 
12 According to Dalence (1851), Bolivian food imports in 1846 were rather limited, consisting of just 
100,000 cargas of potatoes and chuño, “a lot of” ají and “many” arrobas of rice. A low level of Bolivian 
import capacity in the mid 19th century would be consistent with the small size of the mining output and 
exports at the time. This might have been partially overcome, however, by the depreciation of the 
Argentinean peso relative to Bolivian silver and the resulting increase in Bolivian terms of trade with 
Argentina (Irigoin, 2009). Nevertheless, the impact of this process on Bolivian food import capacity 
would have been rather low, since legal imports from Argentina accounted for only 7% of total Bolivian 
imports at the time, and only 12% of these were compounded by food –most commonly cows (Dalence, 
1851: 268-274). In addition, the value of the Bolivian currency in relation with the Argentinean peso was 
not stable over time and, given the persistent monetary heterogeneity in Argentina, probably not uniform 
across regions (see Irigoin, 2009: 563-568). Finally, if our assumption on the low level of Bolivian food 
imports is too low, this problem would involve an overestimation of the agrarian production in the mid 
19th century, but this would be compensated for by the underestimation of the relative value of silver 
exports and production. 
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As has been indicated, our estimate of agrarian output for the mid 19th century is based 
on the information provided by Dalence (1851), who indicated the value of the agrarian 
gross production in Bolivia in 1846 and its composition, as well as an estimation of the 
amounts of different products which represented, overall, 96 percent of the total value 
of the sector. Dalence also provided a calculation of the nutritional needs of the 
Bolivian population in 1846 (excluding animal product consumption) and the resulting 
production surplus of vegetable foodstuffs. According to this author, each Bolivian 
individual would require 2 daily libras of food of vegetal origin. Since he estimated the 
available production to be as high as 3 libras per person, this (together with a small 
amount of food imports) would imply a huge yearly surplus of vegetable foodstuffs in 
the country (1.5 million libras). 
This, however, is difficult to reconcile with the nutritional content of the Bolivian 
agricultural production that he reported in his book. Indeed, in order to meet a nutrient 
availability of 1,940 calories per male adult-equivalent per day,13 and taking into 
account the production of meat and the food imports reported by Dalence, it would be 
necessary to increase the author’s output estimate of each (vegetal) product by 89 
percent. This is what we did to estimate the value of agricultural production in 1846, 
under the assumption that Dalence’s figures were affected by a significant downward 
bias (maybe due to the inability to account for self-consumption; see Langer, 2004).14
                                                          
13 This is the nutrient availability level used by Arroyo-Abad et al. (2012: 153) in their bare-bones basket 
for Latin America during the colonial era. Although this amount is rather low in comparative terms, we 
have preferred to use it here in order to account for the possibility that Dalence underestimated the level 
of food imports (see above, footnote 7). We have excluded the “non-subjected” population from the 
calculation of the nutritional needs of the Bolivian society because we estimate the subsistence production 
of this population separately from the rest (see below). 
 
As a result of this assumption, we obtain an estimate of the Bolivian agrarian output in 
1846 that is substantially higher than the value proposed by Dalence, but which is 
consistent with the nutritional needs of the Bolivian population and whose composition, 
in the case of agricultural products, is the same as in this author’s report. The 
calculations may be seen in detail in Appendix A. 
14 We assume that Dalence’s underestimation mainly affected agricultural produce, rather than livestock. 
This is based on the fact that Dalence’s estimation of meat consumption per person was very similar to 
that provided by the 1950 Agrarian Census, which was around 23 kilograms per year (CEPAL, 1958: 
268). If Dalence’s figures for the whole agrarian sector were accepted, this would represent almost 20 
percent of the total nutritional intake of the population of the country. This percentage is too high to be 
likely; for example, meat has been estimated as representing 12 percent of the total nutritional ingest in 
colonial times in Mexico, Peru, Bolivia and Colombia by Arroyo-Abad et al. (2012: 153). 
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In order to compare that estimate with the sector’s output in 1950, we have taken a sub-
group of goods for which price and quantity data were available for both 1846 and 
1950, and which represented 82 percent of the total gross production in 1846 and 74 
percent in 1950. We expressed the production of those goods in those two years in 1950 
prices, and in each case added up the total value of the products for which unit prices 
and quantities were not available for both years (with the exception of rubber, see 
below). Finally, we have increased gross production in each year by 11 percent to 
account for forestry production.15 According to these calculations, the gross output of 
the agrarian sector in 1950 was approximately twice as high as in 1846. This difference 
has been used to construct an index of output volume that, due to the lack of additional 
information, is assumed to have grown in line with rural population. Finally, we have 
increased that index by the value added of rubber (at 1950 prices), under the assumption 
that all rubber production was exported,16 and by an additional amount to account for 
the food production of the “non-subjected” population.17
Although the paucity of empirical information on the sector prevents us from drawing 
any detailed conclusions on the evolution of the output series, our estimates indicate 
that the agrarian value-added per rural inhabitant would have increased by just 24% in a 
century. This extremely low progress is consistent with the very low levels of Bolivian 
agrarian productivity in the mid 20th century (CEPAL, 1958: 54) and, together with the 
gradual increase in urbanisation, it would help to explain the substantial growth in 
Bolivian food imports that took place since the 1920s. 
 
 
Mining and petroleum industries 
Unlike population or agriculture, the available information on output and prices of 
extractive industries (mining and the oil industry) is abundant and allows reconstructing 
the evolution of the production of silver, tin, copper, gold, antimony, lead, tungsten, 
                                                          
15 This was the percentage in 1950 (CEPAL, 1958); Dalence (1851) does not present data for this sector 
for 1846. 
16 Rubber exports were negligible until 1890, when they started growing at a very quick pace. In the 25 
years before 1915 they amounted, on average, to around 20% of total Bolivian exports. After 1915, due to 
Asian competition, and with the exception of the Second World War years, rubber exports became 
marginal. Export data come from Gamarra (2007) for 1890-1926 and from the official trade statistics 
afterwards. The relative price of rubber in 1950 has been taken from the Christopher Blattman database: 
http://chrisblattman.com. 
17 Under the oversimplifying assumption that these communities lived at subsistence level and all their 
economic activity was food production, we assume their per capita agrarian (and total) GDP to be 300 
Geary-Khamis dollars of 1990. This is the subsistence minimum assumed by Milanovic et al. (2010: 262). 
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zinc and petroleum and its derivatives. Since, in most cases, all output was exported, we 
have often assumed exported quantities to be representative of production.18
Our series on silver production is based, up to 1907, on Klein’s (2011: 304) decennial 
estimates, which have been annualized on the basis of Haber and Menaldo’s (2011) 
database.
 
19 After 1907, we use silver exports figures, taken from the official trade 
statistics. When these were not available, we used Haber and Menaldo’s (2011) data. 
The tin output index is based on export data taken from Haber and Menaldo (2011) up 
to 1903, Peñaloza Cordero (1985) for 1904-1924, and CEPAL (1958) for 1925-1950. 
Silver and tin were the two main minerals produced in Bolivia, and accounted for more 
than three quarters of total mining production in the century before 1950. We also 
estimated the evolution of the output of six other minerals of lower importance: copper 
(from Haber and Menaldo, 2011), gold (from the official trade statistics), and antimony, 
lead, tungsten and zinc (from the official trade statistics for 1908-1930 and Haber and 
Menaldo, 2011, for 1931-1950).20
 We aggregated the resulting eight production indices by using the structure of prices in 
1846, 1908, 1925 and 1950, obtained from information in Haber and Menaldo (2011) 
and Blattman’s database. Finally, we have calculated a single series through weighted 
averages of each pair of aggregate indices, in which the relative weight of each series 
depends on the distance to the year of the price structure of that series. We have then 
used the resulting average volume series as representative of the evolution of mining 
value added (assuming therefore a constant ratio between value added and gross 
production).   
  
In the case of the petroleum industry, the value added series is based on two volume 
indices, raw and refined oil production, that start in 1925 (when this industry was 
established in Bolivia) and are taken from CEPAL (1958: 193). Once more, due to the 
scarcity of information, we have assumed a constant ratio between oil value added and 
gross production between 1925 and 1950, which is 75 percent higher for refined oil than 
for raw oil. 
                                                          
18 On this assumption, see Gómez (1978) and Mitre (1986, 1993). 
19 For this section, we rely on the complete mining production data estimated by Haber and Menaldo, 
which were kindly provided to us by the authors. 
20 We assume that the relative importance of the production of the last four minerals was negligible 
before 1908. 
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 Manufactures 
Following ECLAC, we divide the manufacturing sector into four subsectors: registered 
industry, non-registered industry, urban artisan production and rural artisan production. 
Together with the importance of each of those subsectors in the total manufacturing 
value added in 1950,21 CEPAL (1958) also provides a series of gross production of the 
registered industry and some of its main branches for 1938-50. We have assumed that 
the non-registered industry and urban artisan production grew at the same pace as 
registered industry during those years, and have extended backward the sum of the 
output of those three subsectors until 1925 on the basis of a series of volume of imports 
of raw materials (CEPAL, 1958: 54).22
Unfortunately, there is no systematic information on the evolution of the manufacturing 
sector before 1925, and we can only make a very rough guesstimate on the basis of 
Dalence’s (1851) description of Bolivian industry in 1846. With this information, and 
under the assumption that in 1846 the value added in manufacturing was ca. 50 percent 
of gross production (as in 1950), we can estimate the value added of urban industry in 
1846 as approximately 26 percent of its level in 1925, and link those two benchmark 
years according to the evolution of urban population.
 Assuming a constant ratio between 
manufacturing gross production and value added, this series has been used as 
representative of the evolution of the value added of Bolivian manufacture (always 
excluding rural artisan production) between 1925 and 1950. 
23
                                                          
21 Registered industry: 33.5%; non-registered industry: 29.3%; urban artisan production: 30.4%; and rural 
artisan production: 6.8%. 
 The growth of the resulting 
series is very low until the 1920s, which is consistent with the extremely slow Bolivian 
industrialisation process before that decade (Rodriguez, 1999) and the delay in the 
arrival of modern industrial companies to the country (Tafunell and Carreras, 2008: 
Table 8). It is also consistent with the assessment of the sector included in the 1900 
National Census, according to which the Bolivian industrial sector was composed 
almost entirely of artisans, among which 95 percent were textile producers. In addition, 
on the textile industry, the 1900 Census stated that it was: “(...) still in an embryonic 
22 For each year we have taken the average of the imports of that year and the previous one, in order to 
account for the time lag between the purchase of the raw materials and the commercialization of the 
industrial product. 
23 A similar procedure is followed in Alvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2007) for the early 
modern Spanish economy. 
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state. There is no information about any factory or establishment with the features of a 
stable and improved company. The only factory of this nature in Bolivia is one 
established in the city of La Paz” (1900 National Census, p. LXVII- our translation). 
In the case of rural artisan production, and given the total absence of information, we 
have assumed that the value added of the subsector grew at the same pace as rural 
population between 1890 and 1950. 
 
Utilities 
Due to the absence of information on water distribution services, our estimation of the 
evolution of the value added of the utilities sector is only based on the production of 
electricity.24 The origin of this activity in Bolivia can be traced back to at least 1888, 
when the first electrical plant was established in La Paz (Lázaro, 2010: 39). For 1890-
1930, we assume that electric power capacity grew in line with the imports of electric 
material, which are available in Tafunell (2011).25
 
 After 1930, CEPAL (1958: 171-179) 
provides the total amount of electricity production in Bolivia for several benchmark 
years (1938, 1947 and 1952) and the yearly output of the main producers since 1945. 
This data allow the estimation of a yearly series of electricity production between 1938 
and 1950, using industrial output to calculate the yearly changes between 1938 and 
1945. Finally, we link the 1930 and 1938 estimates by using the increase in Bolivian 
electricity production between 1929 and 1937, provided by ONU (1952), and the yearly 
fluctuations of industrial production.  
Construction 
The value added of the Bolivian construction sector in the mid 20th century has been 
projected backwards on the basis of different indicators. For 1928-1950 we have taken 
the geometric average of two variables: apparent consumption of cement and imports of 
construction materials. The former has been estimated, for 1938-1950, on the basis of 
domestic production (taken from CEPAL, 1958: 161), under the assumption (also 
suggested by CEPAL, 1958) that it completely replaced imports during those years. For 
1928-1938, we have carried out a geometric interpolation between cement imports in 
                                                          
24 We do not consider gas production and distribution because this sector was negligible in Bolivia before 
1950. 
25 We assume that power capacity was the same in 1890 and 1891. 
16 
 
1927 (when domestic production was almost inexistent; see Tafunell, 2006: 15) and 
domestic production in 1938. Imports of construction material since 1928 have also 
been taken from CEPAL (1958:54). For 1912-1927, we have assumed that the value 
added in the sector grew in line with the imports of construction materials (cement 
included), which have been taken from the official trade statistics. Finally, for 1890-
1912 we have used the geometric average of urban population and an index of railway 
construction, which has been estimated by distributing the railway mileage that was 
open each year (Sanz Fernández, 1998) over the five previous years. The resulting value 
added series follows a very similar trend to the estimated urban population during the 
period. 
 
Government services 
The value added of government services has been assumed to grow in line with 
government expenditure expressed in real terms. Data on government expenditure 
comes from Gamarra (2007: 142) for 1890-99, and from our own estimation based on 
official fiscal statistics for 1900-1950 (see Peres-Cajías, 2014). In order to express those 
figures in real terms, we have used, for 1931-1950, the CPI estimated by Gómez (1978). 
Before 1931, given the absence of information on price changes, we have assumed that 
the PPP hypothesis holds. Therefore, we have estimated annual increases in Bolivian 
domestic prices as the product of changes in the British CPI (taken from Clark, 2013) 
and variations in the Bolivian peso/sterling pound exchange rate (taken from Gamarra, 
2007: 142).26
 
 The resulting “pseudo-CPI” series has been smoothed by calculating a 
three year moving average, in order to eliminate the effect of sudden and transient short-
term movements in the exchange rate. 
Transport services 
The value added of transport services has been estimated on the basis of information on 
two sub-sectors: railways and roads.27
                                                          
26 The validity of the methodology described in the text has been tested by comparing the Chilean and 
Peruvian available CPI for the early 20th century (taken from Braun et al., 2000; and Portocarrero et al., 
1992) with an alternative CPI for those countries, estimated as is indicated in the text. Both series are very 
similar in the two cases.  
 First, we have distributed the value added of the 
transport sector in 1950 between those two subsectors according to their respective 
27 Due to its marginal importance during the period, air and river transport services have been ignored. 
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revenues in 1951, as estimated by CEPAL (1958).28 Railway value added has then been 
projected backwards until 1930 on the basis of the evolution of railway ton-kms and 
passenger-kms (taken from www.docutren.com), weighted according to their respective 
unit transport prices in 1955 (estimated from price information in CEPAL, 1958: 226-
227). Before 1930, we have assumed that the value added of railway transport grew in 
line with mining exports, corrected for the evolution of the railway mileage in 
operation.29
The value added of road transport has been projected backward, for 1926-1950, 
according to the evolution of gasoline consumption. This is available in CEPAL (1958: 
199) for 1938-50 and has been extended backward to 1926 using information on 
gasoline imports (taken from the official trade statistics)
 
30 and gasoline production, 
which started in 1931 (also taken from CEPAL, 1958: 197). Before 1926 gasoline 
consumption was very low, reflecting the fact that the presence of trucks was rather 
limited at the time and road transport was still largely dependent on animal power. 
Therefore, for 1890-1926 we have used the sum of (deflated) imports and exports to 
approach the evolution of the value added of road transport.31
 
  
Banking services 
The estimated value added of the services of the financial sector in 1950 has been 
projected backwards on the basis of a deflated series of bank deposits. This series is 
available since 1869, when the first Bolivian Bank (“Banco Boliviano”) was 
established. Information on deposits has been taken from the Extracto Estadístico de 
Bolivia (1935) for 1890-1935 and from Gómez (1978: 199-200) for 1936-1950. 
 
                                                          
28 According to CEPAL (1958), by 1951 railway revenues were 57% of road transport revenues. There is, 
however, a high margin of error in the latter, due to the low quality of the available information. 
29 We have increased the available railway mileage data (www.docutren.com) with an estimate of the 
tramway mileage in operation, calculated from information in Bolivia, República de (1911: 72-73), 
Alarcón (1925) and http://www.tramz.com/bo/bos.html. 
30 For 1933-37 it is impossible to obtain data on gasoline imports from the trade statistics, and we have 
estimated it from information on total fuel imports, taken from CEPAL (1958: 54).  
31 Imports and exports are available in real terms since 1925 in CEPAL (1958: 54). Before 1925 we used 
our estimated CPI to deflate imports and used our volume index of mining output (see above) as indicator 
of the evolution of exports in real terms. 
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Other services  
Information on other services is virtually inexistent. We used indirect indicators to 
project their value added backwards from 1950. In the case of trade services, as has 
been done by other authors (see e.g. Prados de la Escosura, 2003), we assumed that their 
value added grew in line with the evolution of the commercialised physical product, 
which is estimated as the sum of: i) a percentage of agrarian output equivalent to the 
relative importance of urban population on total population; ii) the overall production of 
the extractive and manufacturing industries; iii) total imports. We used two-year 
moving averages to account for stocks. Finally, we assumed that housing rents and other 
services evolved as urban population, allowing, in the case of housing rents, for a 0.5% 
annual increase in quality (see also Prados de la Escosura, 2003). 
Graph 1 present our series for 1890-1950 and compares it with the alternative available 
estimates. The long term trend of our series is very similar to the others, with the 
exception of Morales and Pacheco’s (1999) figure for 1900.32 The main deviations are 
observed in the short-run fluctuations and, more specifically, in the Great Depression. 
According to Morales and Pacheco (1999), Bolivian GDP fell by more than 50 percent 
between 1929 and 1935, and fully recovered in 1936, whereas our estimates would 
indicate a much milder crisis (a 20% fall between 1929 and 1932), but also a much 
more gradual process of recovery to 1929 GDP levels.33
 
 Differences with Mendieta and 
Martín’s estimates are much smaller, although they consider the consequences of the 
Great Depression to have been even less serious (just a 7% fall between 1929 and 1931) 
and the growth of the early 1930s much more intense than in our series. A possible 
explanation for that difference is the influence on their estimation of the evolution of 
M3 and public expenditure, which grew at high rates between 1933 and 1935 due to the 
financial costs of the Chaco War. 
                                                          
32 Apparently (although they do not indicate it explicitly), Morales and Pacheco (1999) assumed that 
Bolivian GDP and exports grew at the same pace between 1900 and 1929. This may partially explain the 
deviation between their series and our own figures on 1900, since we estimate the ratio exports/GDP to 
have grown substantially between 1900 and 1913. 
33 Due to the lack of information on Morales and Pacheco’s estimation methodology, it is not possible to 
know the reasons for that difference, which might be associated to the high weight of certain variables 
(such as public revenues) in these authors’ calculations. On the relatively low impact of the Great 
Depression in Bolivia, see Bértola (2011: 262). 
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Graph 1. Bolivian GDP, 1890-1950: alternative estimates (1950=100) 
 
Sources: Pacheco and Morales (1999), Hofman (2001), Mendieta and Martín (2009) and our own 
estimates. 
Note: Mendieta and Martín’s specific figures are not published in Mendieta and Martín (2009), but were 
kindly provided to us by Pablo Mendieta. 
   
 
3. Bolivian income per capita ca. 1846: a guesstimate 
As has been shown in the previous section, the available statistical information on the 
Bolivian economy becomes increasingly scarce as one goes back in time. As a 
consequence, the margin of error in our series is higher for earlier periods, up to the 
point, around 1890, in which the scarcity of data has prevented us from extending our 
estimation to previous years. Although we have some evidence on the long term trends 
of some of the GDP components, it is impossible to capture differences in growth rates 
among periods or to describe the successive growth cycles of the country. For instance, 
the lack of information makes it impossible to account for the effects of the growth of 
Bolivian coastal areas (the current Chilean region of Antofagasta) since the late 1850s 
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(Klein, 2011: 123, 140-143), or the consequences of their loss to Chile in 1879, in the 
course of the Pacific War.34
However, in order to have a preliminary picture of the long term process of Bolivian 
economic growth in the first few decades after independence, in this section we suggest 
a very rough guesstimate of the level of its income per capita by 1846. This is mainly 
based on the aforementioned description of the Bolivian economy by Dalence (1851), 
which allows comparing the situation of the main sectors of the economy in the mid 19th 
century with their level of development by 1890. Dalence’s description has already been 
used in the previous section to capture the long term trends of those series, such as 
population, agrarian production, or manufactures before 1925, for which information is 
scarcer for the late 19th and early 20th century. 
 
Our guesstimate of Bolivian income per capita in 1846 follows, as far as possible, the 
same sectoral division as the series described in the previous section. As has been 
indicated there, we have estimated the value added of the agrarian sector in 1846 on the 
basis of the nutritional needs of the Bolivian population. We assume that animal 
products were correctly assessed by Dalence (1851) but that, in the case of agricultural 
products, his estimates correctly reflected the composition of output, but not its level. 
The result of these assumptions is an agrarian output figure in 1846 that amounted to 80 
percent of the production of the sector in 1890. We have increased that amount by an 
estimate of the food production of the “non-subjected” population.35
Mining output in 1846 is estimated on the basis of the decennial data of silver 
production provided by Klein (2011: 304) for the period 1840-1909 and the yearly 
fluctuations in the production of silver in Potosi, as presented by Mitre (1986). For the 
volume of tin, copper and gold produced in 1846, we used Dalence’s data on their value 
in 1846 and information on the relative prices of these minerals coming from Haber and 
Menaldo (2011) and Blattman’s database. The resulting amounts would represent 17% 
of the production of this sector in 1890. 
 
                                                          
34 Before the 1850s, the Bolivian coast was a marginal space from an economic point of view. For 
example, population in that region was equivalent to 0.3% of the total Bolivian population in 1846. 
However, this space became increasingly important between the late 1850s and its conquest by Chile in 
the Pacific War, thanks to guano, saltpetre and silver export booms. 
35 On these calculations see the previous section and the Appendix.  
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Manufacturing value added is also estimated on the basis of Dalence’s information, as 
previously described. For government services, we use the data of government 
expenditure in 1846-72 that were published by Huber Abendroth (1991). And, finally, 
estimates for other sectors (rural artisan production, construction, transport, trade, 
housing rents and other services) are based on the evolution of the same indirect 
indicators that have been used to estimate the series for 1890-1950.36
The result of those calculations is a GDP “guesstimate” for 1846 which amounts to 76 
percent of the 1890 GDP. In per capita terms, it would represent 87 percent of the 
Bolivian pc GDP in 1890, which is a first indication of the extremely low growth rate of 
the Bolivian economy during most of the second half of the 19th century. It is important 
to stress, however, that this figure constitutes a very preliminary approach with a very 
high margin of error. Changes in the basic assumptions would involve some variations 
in the estimate, although not large enough to allow rejecting the hypothesis of a 
virtually stagnant economy between 1850 and 1890. For instance, if the pc GDP of the 
“non-subjected” population were assumed to be 200 Geary-Khamis dollars (instead of 
300), the resulting pc GDP in 1846 would be 1 percent lower than our estimate, and if 
we assumed that industrial output was twice as large as indicated by Dalence (as we do 
in the case of agricultural products), the increase in the 1846 GDP pc would be just 6 
percent, and these differences would diminish over time. 
 
 As indicated in the previous section, the assumption which likely has a higher potential 
impact on the estimates is our acceptance of the 1950 Census suggestion that the size of 
the “non-subjected” communities in 1846 was 100,000, i.e. very similar to their size in 
1900 and 1950. If we accepted Dalence’s data of 760,000 people instead, this would 
imply an 18 percent reduction of our pc GDP estimate for 1846 (see above), and an 
increase in the yearly growth rate of income per capita between 1846 and 1890, from 
0.33 to 0.70 percent. This higher growth rate would be the result of the demographic 
shrinking of the “infidel” tribal population that is associated with use of Dalence’s 
figure, and it would still be consistent with the sustained divergence of the Bolivian 
economy during the second half of the 19th century. In summary, our estimate for 1846 
should be considered as an upper bound of the real value of pc GDP, and the size of its 
bias would depend on the actual size of the “infidel” tribal population. 
                                                          
36 Imports, exports and rural and urban population for 1846 have also been taken from Dalence (1851). 
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On the other hand, as indicated in the previous section, one of the main shortcomings of 
this estimation is the absence of long-term information on prices and productivity 
differences among sectors, and the need to rely on the 1950 value added composition 
for the weighting structure of the estimation.37 In the Bolivian case, however, the 
importance of this problem would be reduced by the small importance of the 
manufacturing sector. For instance, if sectoral differences in Bolivian prices were 
assumed to have evolved as in Spain, where the increase in agrarian prices between 
1850 and 1950 was almost twice as large as in the rest of the sectors (Prados de la 
Escosura, 2003) this would mean that the Bolivian pc GDP during the second half of the 
19th century would have been approximately 25 percent higher than our estimates. We 
consider this, however, as a higher bound of the bias associated with this problem, since 
the technological dynamism of Bolivian industry was substantially lower in comparison 
with Spain. A more precise estimation of the size of this bias, however, needs to wait 
for detailed studies into the history of Bolivian prices, something that is beyond the 
scope of this research.38
 
 
4. The Bolivian economy in the long term: growth and divergence since the 
mid 19th century 
 
Graph 2 and Table 3 summarise the evolution of the Bolivian economy between the mid 
19th and the early 21st century. Graph 2 presents per capita GDP from 1846 up to the 
present, and Table 3 provides information on GDP sectoral composition. Table A2 of 
Appendix B provides the complete yearly income per capita series. 
                                                          
37 See Henriques (2012) for a first approach to price movements of specific products in Bolivia in the 
early 19th century. 
38 On the other hand, in an international comparison of Bolivia with higher-growing economies this 
problem would be partially compensated for by the bias in the opposite direction which is associated with 
the use (as is customary in this literature) of the 1990 PPP ratios that underlie the Maddison’s Project 
database. 
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Graph 2. Bolivian pc GDP ($ Geary-Khamis of 1990), 1846-2010 
 
Source: New Maddison Project database and, before 1950, our own figures. 
 
Table 3. Sectoral composition of the Bolivian GDP, 1846-2008 
 Agrarian 
sector 
Mining and 
petroleum 
industries 
Manufactures Utilities and 
construction 
Services 
1846 73 1 8 1 16 
1890-1899 69 6 7 1 17 
1900-1909 65 8 7 1 19 
1910-1919 56 12 8 2 23 
1920-1929 48 16 9 2 25 
1930-1939 45 14 8 3 30 
1940-1950 34 18 12 3 33 
1950-1960 28 15 13 4 40 
1960-1970 26 11 14 6 43 
1970-1980 18 19 15 6 43 
1980-1990 21 14 13 4 48 
1990-2000 16 7 17 6 54 
2000-2008 14 11 14 6 55 
Sources: Own estimations (see text) and, since 1950, ECLAC database. 
Notes: Some rows do not add up to 100 due to rounding. After 1950, we have used the “subtotal” 
provided by ECLAC and have distributed the statistical discrepancies among all sectors, in proportion to 
their size. 
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Graph 2 and Table 3 show the gradual process of economic growth and structural 
transformation undertaken by the Bolivian economy from the first decades after 
independence onward. Income per capita in the early 21st century is 4 times higher than 
it was around 1850. Likewise, the agrarian sector, which accounted for three quarters of 
GDP in the mid 19th century, has experienced a sustained decrease in relative terms, and 
has been replaced by services since the 1950s as the main economic sector. Mining, 
manufacturing, utilities and construction also increased their importance from the mid 
19th century onwards, although the GDP percentages they accounted for reached their 
maximums in the mid-20th century and stagnated thereafter. As a consequence, the 
industrial share of the Bolivian GDP is still among the lowest in the region today. 
Graph 2 confirms some of the ideas advanced by previous research on the long term 
evolution of the Bolivian economy. Firstly, Bolivian economic growth was extremely 
slow until the first years of the 20th century. According to our estimates, between 1846 
and 1903 Bolivian GDP grew at an annual average rate of just 0.68 percent. In per 
capita terms, the yearly growth rate was even lower (0.37 percent). In other words, 
Bolivia seems to have largely missed the initial growth opportunities opened by the first 
globalisation to the Latin American economies. Growth only accelerated from 1903 
onwards, thanks to the expansion of rubber and, especially, tin exports. As a 
consequence of that export boom, the annual average rate of economic growth reached a 
level of 2.67 percent in the case of GDP and 1.73 in the case of GDP capita between 
1903 and 1929. 
The Great Depression put an end to this expansion, largely due to the huge and sudden 
reduction of mineral exports. In the case of tin, for instance, export volume decreased 
by almost 70 percent between 1929 and 1932, while at the same time international 
prices went down by almost 50 percent. However, the Bolivian economy achieved 
positive growth rates again in 1933 thanks to the renewed dynamism of tin exports, the 
increase in government expenditures (especially since the start of the Chaco War against 
Paraguay in 1932) and the expansion of the industrial sector. In addition, the effects of 
the Great Depression may be assumed to have been relatively limited (and highly 
concentrated in the Western Departments, which specialized in mineral exports), 
because by 1940 more than two-thirds of Bolivians were still primarily outside the 
market economy (Klein, 2011: 177). 
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Thereafter, the succession of two extremely destructive crises explains the slow 
progress of the Bolivian economy during the second half of the 20th century. The first 
followed the National Revolution of 1952, which provoked a serious economic 
downturn, largely associated with the indirect costs of the reorganization of the 
economy and inability to correct macroeconomic imbalances that had been generated by 
non-orthodox trade policies (Klein, 2011, pp. 213-222). Indeed, the Revolution brought 
about the consolidation of the State as a central economic agent, and involved an 
increase in government expenditure from 10-15 percent to 30-35 percent of the GDP 
(Peres Cajías, 2014). The growth in the size of the public sector was justified by new 
political leaders as an instrument to achieve higher levels of both equity (e.g. through 
land reform) and efficiency (for instance, by using public resources to further integrate 
the Eastern areas of the country in the domestic economy). The resources necessary to 
implement the new policies, however, could only be obtained in the short term from the 
main mining groups, which were nationalized and taxed through a multiple exchange 
rate system. The outcome of this process was a public mining corporation that suffered 
constant losses. These were financed by the government with monetary expansion, 
which in turn provoked sustained inflation. The combination of currency overvaluation 
(due to the multiple exchange rate regime), monetary expansion, and the conflict and 
destruction associated with the first stages of land reform, provoked a downturn in most 
economic sectors and a significant decrease in aggregate production. Macroeconomic 
stability only returned in the late 1950s, thanks to the application of a “shock therapy” 
policy under the auspices of the US Government and the IMF. However, the 1952 levels 
of GDP and GDP per capita would not be recovered until 1962 and 1967 respectively. 
Between the end of the 1950s and 1978, economic growth resumed, bringing about 
some diversification through the consolidation of the oil industry and agrarian 
production in the Eastern lowlands. However, this new growth episode was still largely 
associated with the country’s traditional growth engine, i.e. natural resource exports. 
Similarly, government resources also remained largely dependent on foreign trade taxes 
(Peres Cajías, 2014). In this context, the external debt crisis of the 1980s represented a 
new economic catastrophe for the Bolivian economy. The decrease in international 
prices of mineral product and constraints on international credit forced the government, 
once more, to appeal to expansionary monetary policies (Morales and Sachs, 1990), 
which had to be further extended to meet public workers’ demand for wage increases. 
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This process ended up giving way to hyperinflation, which lasted until September 1985. 
Hyperinflation and foreign payment controls accelerated the crisis in the mining sector 
and encouraged corruption and smuggling. In the case of industry, the reduction in 
import capacity and the depression in internal demand also provoked a serious 
production crisis and, finally, the agricultural sector of the Western areas was affected at 
the same time by a series of destructive droughts (Luna, 1995). 
The incidence of the three crises of the 20th century was so serious that we can 
characterise the period from 1929 to 2000, in economic terms, as a succession of “lost 
decades”, due to the extremely long period required for the Bolivian economy to 
recover the previous maximum levels of its income per capita: 9 years in the case of the 
Great Depression, 17 years after the 1952 Revolution, and 28 years after the 1978 
shock. The recovery from the last two crises was especially difficult because they were 
contemporaneous with the country’s demographic transition.39
On the other hand, the new series would be consistent, at least until 1950, with the 
characterisation of Bolivian long-term economic growth as an inequality-enhancing 
process. This conclusion is a necessary implication of the low levels of agrarian labour 
productivity that characterized the country from the first decades following 
independence up until 1950. According to our estimates, in 1950 the ratio between 
agrarian production and rural population (which may be taken as a very rough approach 
to the productivity of agrarian workers) was only 23% higher than in 1846. In other 
words, whereas the average income per capita grew at a yearly rate of 0.9 percent 
between those two dates, the average income of agrarian workers, who were the poorest 
part of society and still amounted to two thirds of the population by 1950, would have 
grown at a yearly rate of 0.2 percent. Unlike other Latin American economies, in which 
the increase in inequality during the First Globalisation might be explained by the effect 
of international relations on factor prices (O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999; Frankema, 
2009), in Bolivia it was largely the result of the stagnation and relative isolation of the 
traditional rural economies, which remained largely unaffected by the globalisation 
shock. In this regard, the benefits of economic growth would have been concentrated in 
 
                                                          
39 As a consequence of a steady reduction in mortality rates and the stagnation of birth rates –which were, 
according to CELADE’s estimates, around 45 per 1,000- the annual average growth rate of the Bolivian 
population was around 2% from the early 1950s to the late 1960s, and increased up to 2.3% per year from 
the late 1960s to the early 1990s. It was not until the first years of the 21st century that the Bolivian 
population started growing at annual rates below 2%.  
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mining producers, spreading only gradually to some sectors of the (relatively small) 
urban economy.40
In order to approach Bolivian economic performance from a comparative perspective, 
Graphs 3 and 4 compare the long-term evolution of the Bolivian GDP per capita with 
the average of four industrialised countries, and three large Latin American economies 
(Argentina, Mexico and Peru) since 1890. 
 
 
Graph 3. Bolivian pc GDP as a percentage of the average of four industrialised 
countries and Argentina (1890-2010) (%) 
 
Sources: New Maddison Project database, Johnston and Williamson (2013) and our own figures. 
Notes: “Core” is the unweighted average of the US, UK, French and German pc GDPs. 
 
 
                                                          
40 In addition, inequality in the agrarian sector would also have increased over time, due to the expansion 
of big properties at the expense of land under indigenous communities’ control; see Gotkowitz (2007) and 
Platt (1982). 
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Graph 4. Bolivian pc GDP as a percentage of the Mexican and Peruvian ones 
(1890-2010) (%) 
 
Sources: New Maddison Project database and our own figures. 
 
Graph 3 and 4 clearly show that the gap between Bolivia and the core countries or 
Argentina was very large in 1890. By contrast, differences with Mexico were much 
lower in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and Bolivia might have had a higher 
income per capita than Peru until the first years of the 20th century.41
                                                          
41 However, the comparison of Bolivia with Peru and Mexico is affected by the large error margins of the 
GDP figures for the three countries before the Interwar period. More specifically, the earliest Peruvian 
estimates (557 Geary-Khamis dollars of 1990 in 1896 and twice this level 15 years later) seem rather 
dubious. 
 On the other hand, 
from 1890 onwards the comparative evolution of the Bolivian economy cannot be 
characterised at all as a process of sustained divergence. Indeed, the divergence of the 
Bolivian economy was a phenomenon of the second half of the 20th century and, more 
specifically, it was the result of the catastrophic economic crises of the Bolivian 
economy in the 1950s and (to a lesser extent) the 1980s. In fact, up to 1950 Bolivia 
managed to grow at rates similar to all the other countries represented in the graphs, and 
even to converge with them at certain specific conjunctures. Indeed, by 1950 Bolivian 
income per capita represented a slightly higher percentage of the income per capita of 
the core countries, Argentina and Mexico than in 1890.  
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In fact, in the case of Argentina, Graph 3 shows that the relative distance between both 
countries has remained virtually constant after the crisis that followed the 1952 National 
Revolution. As a consequence, if the whole 20th century is taken together, it is not 
possible to detect any divergence process between the Bolivian and the Argentinean 
economies. Instead, their long-term growth rates seem to have been virtually identical. 
This evolution would not be consistent with the predictions of the “reversal of fortune” 
hypothesis as is presented in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002), which present 
Argentina, compared with Bolivia, as a country benefiting from the institutional effects 
of a low demographic and urbanisation density at the beginning of the colonial period.42
On the other hand, although the first half of the 20th century was a period of slight 
convergence of the Bolivian economy, it is undeniable that, at the end of the 19th 
century its income per capita was already significantly behind, not only the 
industrialised economies, but also the richest Latin American countries, being 
approximately 35 percent of the income per capita of Argentina. Our rough pc GDP 
guesstimate for 1846 allows us to roughly identify the period in which that distance 
arose, by comparing it with the available income per capita figure for the mid 19th 
century. Table 4 presents the results of that comparison. 
  
 
                                                          
42 By contrast, it would instead be in line with the description of the Argentinean economy as constrained 
(like Bolivia) by the presence of extractive institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012) or as affected by 
a negative “institutional reversal” in the early 20th century (Araoz, 2011; Prados de la Escosura and Sanz, 
2009). 
30 
 
Table 4. Bolivian pc GDP as a percentage of other Latin American economies and 
the US (%) (1850-2008) 
 ca. 1850 1890 1950 2010 
Argentina 60 35 38 30 
Brazil 109 108 113 45 
Chile 82 43 51 22 
Colombia 152 119 88 43 
Cuba 97 57 92 78* 
Mexico 114 88 80 40 
Uruguay 51 40 41 27 
Venezuela 102 99 25 31 
US 40 25 20 10 
Sources: New Maddison Project database and our own figures. 
Note: (*) In 2008. 
 
 
As may be seen in the table, in the mid-19th century Bolivian pc GDP was already 
clearly below the level of income per capita of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and the US, 
i.e. those American economies which, according to the reversal of fortune hypothesis, 
enjoyed a higher growth potential when they started their history as independent 
republics. In other words, the gap between Bolivia and those economies can be traced 
back at least to the first decades after independence. By contrast, by 1850 Bolivia was 
not significantly poorer than most economies in the region, and it might actually have 
been much richer than countries like Colombia and Venezuela. 
In the forty years before 1890, however, the Bolivian economy seems to have fallen 
behind most Latin American economies, with the exception of Brazil. This negative 
performance would have come to a halt in the late 19th or early 20th century, when the 
growth of the Bolivian economy was enough to keep or, in some cases, reduce distances 
between Bolivia and several other economies in the region. As a result, by 1950 Bolivia 
had similar pc GDP levels to Brazil, Mexico and Colombia (although it was still much 
poorer than the US and the Southern Cone countries). Divergence with most of the 
region, however, was clearly resumed (as has been shown above) from the 1950s 
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onwards, when Bolivia could not keep pace with those economies’ dynamism. It was 
therefore only in the second half of the 20th century that Bolivia clearly joined the ranks 
of the poorest economies of Latin America. In other words, whereas Bolivia was 
already far behind from the Southern Cone countries by 1850, the current Bolivian 
poverty levels relative to countries such as Brazil, Colombia or Mexico are not a long-
term historical phenomenon (as is suggested in Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012), but, to 
a large extent, the consequence of the shrinking of the economy after the 1952 
revolution and the longer duration of the Bolivian “lost decade”.43
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The reversal of fortune hypothesis suggests that European colonisers were more prone 
to establish extractive institutions in rich areas (including present-day Bolivia), and 
institutions that encouraged investment in poor regions (like today’s Argentina). After 
independence, the persistence in the rent-seeking and investment-discouraging character 
of the institutional framework in previously rich areas would have prevented them from 
taking advantage of the available opportunities to grow and industrialise and would 
have condemned them to sustained divergence (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 
2002; Dell, 2010). In the case of postcolonial Bolivia, according to this hypothesis, in 
the long term we should therefore expect lower growth rates than in the highest income 
countries in the region. 
The picture that arises from the new estimates, however, is much more complex. Firstly, 
most of the current distance between Bolivia and the US or the Southern Cone 
economies had already opened up by 1900, due to the country’s disappointing 
performance during the early decades of the first globalisation period. By contrast, 
during the first half of the 20th century, Bolivia managed to converge with several 
industrialised economies and the Southern Cone countries, and to grow faster than most 
Latin American economies. In other words, as Austin (2008: 1013) reminds us in the 
case of Sub-Saharan Africa, the Bolivian growth record has not always been “tragic”. It 
was only after 1950, and due to the succession of two economic catastrophes (the crisis 
                                                          
43 The main exception to that common pattern was Venezuela, due to its specific growth trajectory, which 
can be explained by the evolution of the Venezuelan oil industry. In that case, Bolivian divergence was 
sustained until 1950 but did not continue thereafter. 
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that followed the 1952 Revolution and the external debt crisis of the 1980s), that 
Bolivian divergence was resumed and the country was clearly left behind economies 
like Brazil, Mexico or Peru, which had so far seen a similar level of development. To 
sum up, whereas the distance between Bolivia and Argentina, which were presented in 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) as the typical example of the reversal of 
fortune hypothesis, was the outcome of the former’s stagnation during the 19th century, 
the current position of the country in the Latin American ranking is largely the result of 
an extremely negative economic experience during the second half of the 20th century. 
On the other hand, long-term Bolivian economic growth seems to have been closely 
associated with increasing inequality, due to the concentration of GDP gains in the 
hands of a small portion of the Bolivian population. Finding out to what extent the 
extractive character of Bolivian economic growth had an institutional origin would 
require further research. However, it seems to have been largely determined by the 
country’s resource endowment, which conditioned the way in which Bolivia took part in 
the first globalization. In other words, it was the mining specialization of the Bolivian 
economy which kept a large share of the traditional rural economies unaltered by the 
evolution of the international economy. 
Similarly, it is not clear to what extent Bolivian divergence can be attributed to its 
institutional specificity. As has been indicated, at least during the 20th century, Bolivian 
divergence was the result of three critical episodes. Two of them were international 
depressions, which can hardly be associated with any Bolivian particularity: and the 
higher incidence of the crisis of the 1980s in this country would be mainly associated to 
some exogenous factors, such as its delayed demographic transition or the succession a 
several bad agricultural years. The crisis of the 1950s, by contrast, was a purely 
Bolivian phenomenon but, interestingly enough, it was associated with the substitution 
of more inclusive institutions in place of the previous more extractive institutions. In 
other words, all these processes call for careful specific analyses and it is difficult to 
interpret them on the basis of unidimensional institutional explanations.  As has been 
highlighted by Austin (2008) and Frankema and Van Waijenburg (2012) in the case of 
African economies, the Bolivian case also represents a clear warning against the risks of 
the “compression of history”. 
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Appendix A. Estimation of the nutrient content of the Bolivian agrarian 
production in 1846 
 
As is indicated in the text, our estimation of Bolivian agrarian production in 1846 is 
based on the following assumptions: i) nutrient availability was 1,940 calories per male 
adult-equivalent per day; ii) animal products were correctly assessed by Dalence (1851); 
and iii) in the case of agricultural products, Dalence’s estimates correctly reflect the 
composition of output, but not its level. 
Table A1 indicates the indices of different products’ nutrient content, which are the 
basis of our calculation and the percentage contribution of each product to the nutrition 
of the Bolivian population that results from Dalence’s data, after our correction. 
 
Table A1. Food production and nutrient content of the Bolivian agrarian output in 
1846 according to Dalence (1851) 
Product Calories per 
kilogram 
Percentage contribution to the 
nutrition of the Bolivian 
population 
Wheat 3,420 18.50 
Maize 3,180 48.94 
Potatoes 700 5.70 
Rice 3,420 0.46 
Peas 2,790 2.07 
Quinua  3,680 1.85 
Ají  400 0.12 
Chuño  3,230 7.41 
Ocas  670 0.57 
Chickpea 2,920 0.01 
Cañagua  3,400 0.64 
Pumpkin 260 0.28 
Olives 1,060 0.00 
Vegetables 233 0.19 
Plantain 890 0.89 
Nuts and 
coco 
5,250 0.58 
Grapes and 
sweet cane 
1,780 1.11 
Other fruits 430 1.14 
Meat 2,482 9.52 
Sources: Own elaboration based on Dalence (1851); the nutritional content has been obtained from 
Arroyo-Abad et al. (2012), Simpson (1989), Allen (2001), Allen et al. (2011) and the USDA National 
Nutrients Database. 
Notes: i) Calories/person/day has been calculated in relation to the male-adult-equivalent population (see 
text); ii) the global calculation does not include imports.  
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In order to do the calculations, we have transformed the traditional weight units that 
were used by Dalence (fanegas, cargas, arrobas and libras) in kilograms. While 
Dalence does not offer a table with the equivalences, he presents the total weight in 
pounds (libras) of an aggregate of different products that were expressed in several 
units. The following equivalences would be consistent with that information: 1 libra, 
0.46 kgr; 1 arroba, 25 libras; 1 carga, 100 libras; 1 fanega, 105 libras. These values, in 
addition, would be the only ones jointly consistent with the equivalences of these units 
in the Bolivian provinces, as reported in: http://sizes.com/units/44
On the other hand, we assume a nuclear family of a father, a mother and two children 
consumed the same quantity as three male adults (Allen et al., 2011). Considering this 
relationship and the population structure of 1900, which is offered by the 1900 National 
Census, the total population in 1846 has been converted into total adult population. We 
have also accounted for the food imports reported by Dalence (1851: 236): 100,000 
cargas of potatoes and chuño, “a lot of” ají and many arrobas of rice, and we have 
assumed that ají and rice imports had the same weight as potatoes and chuño imports. 
We have finally added up the nutritional contributions made by milk and eggs (taken 
from Allen et al., 2011). 
  
 
Appendix B. 
 
Table A2. Bolivian pc GDP ($ Geary-Khamis of 1990), 1846-2010 
Year pc GDP Year pc GDP Year pc GDP 
1846 743 1909 1036 1930 1431 
  1910 1075 1931 1280 
1890 854 1911 1094 1932 1179 
1891 860 1912 1121 1933 1226 
1892 872 1913 1168 1934 1317 
1893 872 1914 1110 1935 1363 
1894 907 1915 1128 1936 1399 
1895 907 1916 1154 1937 1494 
1896 848 1917 1228 1938 1525 
1897 868 1918 1233 1939 1561 
1898 887 1919 1227 1940 1673 
1899 891 1920 1212 1941 1771 
1900 917 1921 1160 1942 1794 
1901 949 1922 1256 1943 1833 
1902 917 1923 1260 1944 1812 
                                                          
44 The fanega equivalence raises more doubts than the rest, because a value of 105 libras would be 
relatively low (although still possible) in the Bolivian context and, unfortunately, we have been unable to 
locate the “legal” Bolivian fanega of the mid 19th century, which is the specific fanega used by Dalence. 
However, the equivalence that we use is the only one that is consistent with the global amounts of 
production reported by Dalence. The only alternative to using a higher weight equivalence for the fanega 
would be to use a lower one for the carga and the arroba, but we are already applying the lowest possible 
weights for those two units.  
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1903 915 1924 1303 1945 1861 
1904 916 1925 1345 1946 1814 
1905 947 1926 1353 1947 1755 
1906 980 1927 1436 1948 1874 
1907 984 1928 1478 1949 1934 
1908 1014 1929 1522 1950 1889 
Source: see text. 
 
